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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, Patricia Rowe signed a one-year telephone contract with
AT&T.1 In 2012, when she sought to terminate her contract, she was
informed that she would be charged a $600 cancellation fee because her
service had been automatically set to renew every thirty-six months.2 Ms.
Rowe had not at any point opted in to the automatic renewal of her service,
though AT&T claimed to have informed her of it in 2010 in one of her
monthly bill statements.3 Ms. Rowe initiated a class action lawsuit against
AT&T in 2014 on behalf of herself and 900 similarly situated customers,
contesting the fee as excessive.4 When the class action was disbanded under
her contract’s individual-arbitration mandate, Ms. Rowe had no choice but
to pay the exorbitant fee, because individual arbitration of her claim “would
have cost far more.”5
Arbitration is an alternative form of dispute resolution to traditional
litigation. It typically takes place in a conference room, witnesses and
lawyers may or may not be involved, and the arbitrator or panel of
arbitrators—the presiding third party—can be virtually any neutral person
the parties select.6 Many of the procedural elements characteristic of
litigation, such as the guidance of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or

1

Rowe v. AT&T, Inc., No. 6:13-cv-01206-GRA, 2014 WL 172510, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 15, 2014).
Id. at *2.
3 Id.
4 See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of
Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/dealbook/
arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html [https://perma.cc/K2ER-HH97].
5 See id.
6 See KATHERINE V.W. STONE & ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE ARBITRATION
EPIDEMIC: MANDATORY ARBITRATION DEPRIVES WORKERS AND CONSUMERS OF THEIR RIGHTS 5
(2015), https://files.epi.org/2015/arbitration-epidemic.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZEE7-6YGU]; see also AM.
ARB. ASS’N, CONSUMER ARBITRATION RULES 7 (2014), https://www.adr.org/sites/default/files/
Consumer-Rules-Web.pdf [https://perma.cc/4P9F-3WU4] (classifying arbitrators as “neutral and
independent decision makers”).
2
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Evidence or the presence of a jury, are absent from an arbitration
proceeding.7 It is the arbitrator’s role to hear any and all evidence each side
may seek to submit, and then render a binding decision.8 Thus, the
proceeding is characterized by greater informality and flexibility than
litigation, forcing the parties to rely heavily on the expertise and fairness of
the arbitrator to reach a “just outcome.”9 When the parties are merchants of
equal bargaining power and knowledge, they can codesign a procedure and
select an arbitrator whom they both trust.10 Indeed, Congress enacted the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in 1925 to provide such an alternative for
commercial actors to resolve their business disputes swiftly and without the
delay and cost that can accompany litigation.11
Arbitration’s well-meaning nature begins to crumble, however, in the
context of a mandatory-arbitration agreement between a corporation and a
consumer who is required to enter the agreement in order to purchase a
product or avail herself of a service. Without the knowledge, resources, and
experience of their commercial counterparts, and without the formal
protections of litigation, these consumers are susceptible to manipulation and
unjust outcomes.12 These consumers’ vulnerability expands massively when
a given arbitration provision includes a clause requiring that all arbitration
must be individual, preventing multiple plaintiffs from aggregating similar
claims.13 These clauses are known as class arbitration waivers.14
Aggregation is one of the only avenues consumers have to seek redress
when they are harmed in some way because of a company’s product or
service. The likelihood that a consumer can individually achieve relief is
extremely slim because attorneys will not take on cases involving small-sum
claims—which are typical in these situations15—or because the singular
plaintiff cannot take on the financial burden or time away from work to

7 See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 6, at 5; AM. ARB. ASS’N, supra note 6, at 7 (noting that the
arbitrator makes all procedural decisions in the case that are not mutually decided by the parties).
8 See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 6, at 5.
9 Id.
10 See id.
11 See infra Part I.
12 See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 6, at 3–5.
13 Id. at 4.
14 Zachary R. Brecheisen, Making the Withdrawal: The Effect AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion Will
Have on State Laws Similar to California’s Discover Bank Rule, 4 YEARBOOK ON ARB. & MEDIATION
429, 429 (2012) (referring to class action waivers in the arbitration context as class arbitration waivers).
15 STONE & COLVIN, supra note 6, at 16, 21–22 (“Given the relatively small amounts of many
consumer financial transactions and the similarity across claims, the availability of class actions is a
crucial element in providing access to justice for consumer financial claims.”).

877

NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

participate in the arbitration process.16 While some have pointed to data
evidencing larger rewards for consumers in arbitration than in class action
lawsuits, such data ignore the massive gulf between consumer and corporate
wins in arbitration.17 In other words, “[t]he realistic alternative to a class
action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a
lunatic or a fanatic sues for $30.”18
This Note joins the legal discourse on the subject of class arbitration
waivers and the FAA. First, this Note calls for a careful textualist19
interpretation of the FAA. Subsequently, it places the statute’s legislative
history and the Supreme Court’s line of case law with respect to arbitration
in conversation with each other to highlight the serious flaws in the Court’s
interpretation and application of the FAA. The examination of those flaws
supports a statutory purposivist20 argument that the FAA was never intended
to enforce arbitration provisions that would bar consumers from seeking
relief from corporations. From there, this Note advocates for a legal realist21
application of the statute. It discusses the consequences of the Court’s current
treatment of the FAA and the harms that forced arbitration inflicts upon
consumers in contemporary practice. This Note further contemplates the
disparately harsh impact arbitration and its encumbrances have on
socioeconomically deprived and marginalized consumers. Under legal
realism—which calls for interpreting and furthering the law in the way that

16 See Consumer Arbitration Fact Sheet, AM. ARB. ASS’N, https://go.adr.org/consumer-arbitration
[https://perma.cc/S7QM-546M] (finding the length of the average arbitration proceeding to be about
seven months).
17 See Heidi Shierholz, Correcting the Record: Consumers Fare Better Under Class Actions Than
Arbitration, ECON. POL’Y INST. (Aug. 1, 2017), https://www.epi.org/publication/correcting-the-recordconsumers-fare-better-under-class-actions-than-arbitration/ [https://perma.cc/SLA3-B7BU] (noting that
the average consumer recovers $5,389 in arbitration but only 9% of consumers obtain any relief in an
arbitration against a company, whereas 93% of companies win in arbitrations against consumers in both
individual and aggregated arbitrations).
18 Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004).
19 Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: Methodological Consensus
and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1762 (2010) (explaining that the textualist
approach to statutory interpretation “centers on the primacy of enacted text as the key tool in statutory
interpretation” and “emphasizes textual analysis, interpretive predictability, and cabined judicial
discretion”).
20 Id. at 1764 (defining the purposivist approach as one that considers “an array of extrinsic
interpretive aids, including legislative history” to interpret the statute’s language and effectuate its
purpose); see also Purposivism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “purposivism” as
“[t]he doctrine that texts are to be interpreted to achieve the broad purposes that their drafters had in mind;
specif., the idea that a judge-interpreter should seek an answer not only in the words of the text but also
in its social, economic, and political objectives”).
21 Legal Realism, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “legal realism” as “[t]he use
of policy analysis to resolve a legal problem based on what best promotes public welfare”).
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best serves the public welfare22—courts must consider these practical
realities when interpreting and administering the FAA, a statute intended to
instill efficiency in business-to-business dealings with an explicit carveout
for equitable considerations. Thus, regardless of which theory of statutory
interpretation one adopts, the Supreme Court’s treatment of the FAA in the
class arbitration context is unjustifiable. Finally, this Note concludes with a
proposal to revive the unconscionability doctrine—an equitable defense a
party in breach of a contract can raise to have the contract, or a portion of it,
invalidated23—with respect to class arbitration waivers. This Note uniquely
contributes to the scholarly landscape, in which commentators tend to
dismiss unconscionability as a possible defense to these waivers’ validity
because of existing jurisprudence.24 In hopes of changing that jurisprudential
course, this Note calls upon textualism, purposivism, and realism to solve
the problem that is the current legal position of the FAA.
Part I begins with a brief examination of the FAA’s origins and the
legislative intent underlying its enactment. Part II surveys the evolution of
the Supreme Court’s application of the FAA to an ever-expanding array of
contractual disputes. This Note focuses on the major cases of the last decade
in particular, as therein lies the “most pernicious development in
arbitration”25: pairing mandated arbitration with class arbitration waivers,
which the Court has left essentially untouchable. Finally, Part III presents
three interrelated jurisprudential avenues through which future litigants can
and should attack the Court’s decisions—particularly AT&T Mobility LLC v.
Concepcion,26 which, along with its progeny, has almost impermeably
sheltered class arbitration waivers for the past decade. On textualist,
purposivist, and legal realist grounds, future litigants ought to be able to
claim unconscionability as a defense with measurable success, especially
when social justice concerns insist upon it.

22

Id.
See, e.g., Susan Landrum, Much Ado About Nothing?: What the Numbers Tell Us About How State
Courts Apply the Unconscionability Doctrine to Arbitration Agreements, 97 MARQ. L. REV. 751, 764
(2014) (explaining that, depending on the state, courts have a range of remedies under the
unconscionability doctrine, from excising unconscionable provisions from contracts to refusing to enforce
the contracts altogether).
24 See infra notes 101–103 and accompanying text.
25 STONE & COLVIN, supra note 6, at 4.
26 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
23
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I.

THE FEDERAL ARBITRATION ACT: ORIGINS AND ENACTMENT

The push for a national arbitration act was a product of the surging
industrial growth taking place from 1890 to 1920 in the United States.27 As
mass production accelerated and demand grew, businesses and commercial
actors found themselves increasingly in need of an alternative form of
dispute resolution that would allow them to resolve typical issues more
efficiently than was often possible in traditional litigation.28 Arbitration
seemed a natural choice, given that it did away with many of the procedural
elements that contributed to the length of litigation, such as compliance with
federal procedural and evidentiary rules.29 In the early twentieth century,
however, U.S. common law furnished no mechanism to enforce arbitration
agreements, making it easy for the more reluctant commercial party to avoid
arbitrating disputes.30 The federal courts possessed a “judicial hostility”31
towards arbitration inherited from English courts that consistently held that
“performance of a written agreement to arbitrate would not be enforced in
equity, and . . . if an action at law were brought . . . such agreement could not
be pleaded in bar of the action.”32 To push the courts in a more arbitrationfriendly direction, various business lobbyists and members of the American
Bar Association’s Committee on Commerce, Trade, and Commercial Law
drafted and promoted the New York Arbitration Act.33 The same key players
subsequently used the New York statute as a model for the Federal
Arbitration Act, which Congress enacted in 1925.34 The drafters’ stated
purpose was to make written agreements to arbitrate enforceable.35

27 See Rachel M. Schiff, Note, Not So Arbitrary: Putting an End to the Calculated Use of Forced
Arbitration in Sexual Harassment Cases, 53 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 2693, 2723 (2020).
28 Id. at 2724.
29 See sources cited supra note 7.
30 See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 6, at 7; see also Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction:
How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 99, 101 (2006) (“Before the enactment, a party to an arbitration agreement could at any time prior
to the award simply refuse to arbitrate and courts would not enforce the agreement.”).
31 Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on the Merits:
Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 323 (2013).
32 Moses, supra note 30, at 102 (quoting S. REP. NO. 68-536, at 2 (1924)); see also Gabriel Herrmann,
Note, Discovering Policy Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 779, 784 (2003)
(noting that courts often justified revoking arbitration agreements because they ran counter to public
policy by “oust[ing] the jurisdiction” of the courts).
33 See Moses, supra note 30, at 101; Arbitration of Interstate Commercial Disputes: Joint Hearings
Before the Subcomms. on the Judiciary on S. 1005 and H.R. 646, 68th Cong. 16 (1924) [hereinafter Joint
Hearings] (statement of Julius Cohen).
34 Joint Hearings, supra note 33, at 99, 102; Comm. on Com., Trade and Com. L., The United States
Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153, 153, 155 (1925).
35 See Moses, supra note 30, at 128.
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At the Joint Hearings of the Senate and House Subcommittees
regarding the FAA, a congressmember highlighted that arbitration “saves
time, saves trouble, saves money[,] . . . preserves business friendships[,] . . .
raises business standards,” and prevents contracting commercial partners
from facing “unnecessary” litigation.36 Julius Cohen, the American Bar
Association (ABA) member credited with drafting the FAA,37 emphasized
that businesses required faster and simpler solutions to their disputes and that
the statute would not infringe upon states’ rights to establish their own
jurisdictional contract law.38 The hearings demonstrated that the focus of the
FAA was merchant-to-merchant, not merchant-to-consumer, arbitrations.39
Specifically, the initial promoters of the FAA sought to make enforceable
only those arbitration agreements “voluntarily placed in the document by the
parties to it.”40 During the hearings, one Senator raised the question of
“whether the legislation would apply to contracts which were not really
voluntary”—in other words, in contracts where one party’s bargaining power
dwarfed that of the other, enabling it to offer a contract on a “take-it-or-leaveit” basis.41 In response, the others on the Committee refused to endorse such
an application because the primary aim of the FAA would be to enforce
agreements between merchants.42 In short, while Congress largely planned
for the FAA to make arbitration agreements enforceable, thereby placing
them on “equal footing with other contractual agreements,”43 Congress did
36

Id. at 102 (quoting Joint Hearings, supra note 33, at 7).
See id.
38 See id. at 103. This Note does not focus on the intended breadth of the FAA or whether the statute
should span both federal and state law issues. However, Cohen’s arguments about separating state
jurisdiction serve to illustrate the Court’s distortion of the scope of the FAA, as discussed below. See
infra notes 49–58 and accompanying text.
39 See Moses, supra note 30, at 106.
40 Id. at 108 (quoting 65 CONG. REC. 1931 (1924)).
41 Id. at 106; see also Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Federal
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 67th Cong. 9 (1923) [hereinafter Sales and Contracts] (providing that the Senator expressed
that in reality, such agreements “are really not voluntar[y] things at all”).
42 Sales and Contracts, supra note 41, at 10 (noting that such an outcome “ought to be protested
against, because it is the primary end of this contract that it is a contract between merchants one with
another, buying and selling goods”); see also Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1642–43 (2018)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The business community’s aim was to secure to merchants an expeditious,
economical means of resolving their disputes. . . . The legislative hearings and debate leading up to the
FAA’s passage evidence Congress’ aim to enable merchants of roughly equal bargaining power to enter
into binding agreements to arbitrate commercial disputes.” (citing 65 CONG. REC. 11,080 (1924) (remarks
of Rep. Mills))).
43 Herrmann, supra note 32, at 785 (citing Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270
(1995)); see also Willy E. Rice, Unconscionable Judicial Disdain for Unsophisticated Consumers and
Employees’ Contractual Rights?—Legal and Empirical Analyses of Courts’ Mandatory Arbitration
37
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not intend to allow a party with greater bargaining power to force the weaker
party into arbitration.44
Unanimously passed in Congress,45 the FAA represented a major
victory for business and commercial actors. The 1925 text of § 2 of the
statute—its operative provision—provided:
a written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter
arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole
or any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an
existing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall
be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law
or in equity for the revocation of any contract.46

In essence, the FAA’s plain language states that arbitration provisions in
transactional agreements will be enforced “save upon,” or except for, when
the circumstances of the agreement satisfy a basis in either law or equity that
would allow for the revocation of a contract. The drafters, then, believed that
supporting arbitration was paramount. Notably, however, they still expressly
included a carveout for situations in which enforcing an arbitration
agreement would be inequitable and perhaps unjust.
Operating under the understanding that the FAA applied to neither
consumer nor employment contracts, courts interpreted the FAA
conservatively from 1925 into the 1980s, only invoking it in the narrow
context of “commercial cases involving federal law that were brought in
federal courts on an independent federal ground.”47 Starting in the 1980s,
however, the Supreme Court handed down a series of decisions that
massively expanded the scope of the FAA’s reach, culminating in the
statute’s present-day application to all contracting parties.

Rulings and the Systematic Erosion of Procedural and Substantive Unconscionability Defenses Under
the Federal Arbitration Act, 1800–2015, 25 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 143, 165 (2016) (noting that the
congressional record reveals Congress’s reasons for enacting the FAA to include allowing merchants of
equal sophistication and power to “fashion voluntary arbitration agreements,” encouraging courts to
enforce those agreements, increasing efficiency in resolution of trade disputes between merchants, and
preserving business relationships).
44 Moses, supra note 30, at 108.
45 Id. at 110.
46 Act of Feb. 12, 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-401, § 2, 43 Stat. 883, 883 (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 2)
(emphasis added).
47 STONE & COLVIN, supra note 6, at 7.
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II. SUPREME COURT APPLICATIONS OF THE FEDERAL
ARBITRATION ACT
As previously mentioned, the FAA’s initial influence was minimal,
applying only to the kinds of transactions discussed in the enacting
congressional hearings: commercial contracts between businesses.48
Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century and into the early twentyfirst century, however, the Supreme Court issued a series of decisions that
completely transformed the scope of the FAA to include all kinds of
contracts,49 beginning with Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.50
The Prima Paint Court introduced the new characterization of the FAA,
holding that the FAA was a source of federal substantive law under the
Commerce Clause, and thus rendering state law powerless to displace the
FAA under the Supremacy Clause.51 In other words, after Prima Paint,
situations where a state’s contract law might have exempted an arbitration
provision from the FAA’s protection were less likely to occur. That finding
“planted a seed that blossomed”52 in Southland Corp. v. Keating, just under
twenty years later.53
In Keating, a group of 7-Eleven franchisees sued their franchisor,
Southland, in California state court.54 Southland moved to compel arbitration
under their franchise agreement, and the Court upheld the agreement despite
the California Franchise Investment Law,55 which theoretically negated

48

Schiff, supra note 27, at 2723. For examples of courts applying the FAA to agreements between
two merchants in this period, see Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978, 985–
92 (2d Cir. 1942); Kanmak Mills, Inc. v. Soc’y Brand Hat Co., 236 F.2d 240, 250–52 (8th Cir. 1956);
Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402, 409–12 (2d Cir. 1959); and Metro Indus.
Painting Corp. v. Terminal Constr. Co., 181 F. Supp. 130, 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
49 See Schiff, supra note 27, at 2723 (“The FAA no longer merely stands for the right of commercial
parties engaging in interstate commerce to manage their disputes out of the court system. Instead, the
FAA extends to cover almost every contract including credit-card agreements, pay-day loans, . . . and
computer purchases.” (footnotes omitted)).
50 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
51 Id. at 405; see also Alex Brunino, Comment, A Modest Proposal: Review of the National
Consumer Law Center’s Model State Consumer and Employee Justice Enforcement Act, 95 OR. L. REV.
569, 575 (2017) (“[I]n Prima Paint, the Court held that, in federal court, the FAA is a source of federal
substantive law under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution . . . . Prima Paint thus established that
the FAA would henceforth be interpreted and applied as substantive law . . . .”). But see Prima Paint,
388 U.S. at 422 (Black, J., dissenting) (“Even if Congress intended to create substantive rights by passage
of the Act, I am wholly convinced that it did not intend to create such a sweeping body of federal
substantive law completely to take away from the States their power to interpret contracts made by their
own citizens in their own territory.”).
52 Schiff, supra note 27, at 2718.
53 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
54 Id. at 3–4.
55 Id. at 4–5, 17.
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arbitration provisions in franchise agreements.56 In so doing, the Court held
that the FAA was substantive federal law that preempted the contrary
California statute.57 The Keating Court also claimed that by enacting the
FAA, “Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration.”58 From the
framework erected in Keating, the Court took up a staunchly pro-arbitration
stance, in stark contrast to lower courts’ prior hesitance to uphold arbitration
contracts. Over thirty years later, the Court has not once looked back.
As time went on, in light of the Court’s freshly favorable position with
regard to arbitration provisions, arbitration agreements began cropping up in
increasing numbers.59 In response, states began exerting legislative efforts to
protect consumers and employees from “oppressive” arbitration agreements,
though these were met with great resistance from the Court.60 Commercial
actors and businesses came to realize that the new pro-arbitration legal world
in which they found themselves gave them tremendous license to effectively
insulate themselves from liability to their consumer clients, especially
through the use of mandatory arbitration agreements with class arbitration
waivers.61
For a while, consumer plaintiffs were able to effectively plead their
cases under long-standing state contract law principles such as the

56

See Schiff, supra note 27, at 2718.
See id. at 2718–19.
58 465 U.S. at 10. The Court pulled this holding from its 1983 opinion involving an arbitration
agreement between a hospital and a construction contractor, wherein the Court declared that the FAA
manifests a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration,” and that any contractual ambiguities ought to be
resolved in favor of arbitration. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24
(1983).
59 See, e.g., Scott Medintz, Forced Arbitration: A Clause for Concern, CONSUMER REPS. (Jan. 30,
2020), https://www.consumerreports.org/mandatory-binding-arbitration/forced-arbitration-clause-forconcern/ [https://perma.cc/DQH4-22YL] (noting that arbitration clauses have become significantly more
common in recent decades—first in the financial and telecommunications industries and more recently
in consumer products and services); see also ALEXANDER J.S. COLVIN, ECON. POL’Y INST., THE
GROWING USE OF MANDATORY ARBITRATION 3 (2017), https://files.epi.org/pdf/135056.pdf
[https://perma.cc/JRD5-7UJ8] (noting that arbitration was expanding in the 1990s and that by the early
twenty-first century, nearly 25% of the American workforce was subject to forced arbitration).
60 See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 6, at 8–9 (discussing an attempt by the Montana legislature to
ensure that consumers knew that they were consenting to arbitration when they contracted with large
companies, and reporting that the Supreme Court struck down the attempt, holding that the law was
“restrictive of arbitration and therefore preempted”).
61 See Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 4 (stating that class arbitration waivers provide
“companies like American Express . . . a way to circumvent the courts and bar people from joining
together in class-action lawsuits, realistically the only tools citizens have to fight illegal or deceitful
business practices”).
57
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unconscionability doctrine62 and cause some courts to invalidate such class
arbitration waivers. Unconscionability can be measured by whether, in the
context of a particular transaction or commercial setting, the provisions of
the contract are extremely one-sided at the time of formation.63 Under the
unconscionability doctrine, depending on the jurisdiction, a court could
invalidate an arbitration agreement if it was substantively or procedurally
unconscionable.64 An agreement is procedurally unconscionable if it arises
from stark inequality in bargaining power and lack of negotiation between
the parties.65 An agreement is substantively unconscionable, on the other
hand, if it arises from unfair or one-sided terms favoring the party of greater
bargaining power.66
The Supreme Court drew a firm line in the sand with respect to
unconscionability arguments in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.67 There,
the Concepcions purchased cellphones and service plans from AT&T,
entering a contract that provided for arbitration of all disputes on an
individual basis.68 The phones were advertised as free, yet the Concepcions
62 For an example of a court using the state contract law principle of unconscionability, see Discover
Bank v. Super. Ct., 113 P.3d 1100, 1110 (Cal. 2005). In Discover Bank, the Supreme Court of California
created a rule that held that when a consumer contract contains a class arbitration waiver in a setting “in
which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages,” and when
the consumer alleges that the corporation “has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers
of consumers out of individually small sums of money,” then the waiver is “unconscionable under
California law and should not be enforced.” Id.
63 Landrum, supra note 23, at 763.
64 See Colleen McCullough, Comment, Unconscionability as a Coherent Legal Concept, 164 U. PA.
L. REV. 779, 781–82 (2016) (describing procedural unconscionability as arising out of issues in contract
formation—including lack of literacy or sophistication, hidden or unduly complex terms, or nefarious
bargaining tactics—and substantive unconscionability as arising from terms so one-sided “as to shock the
court’s conscience” (quoting Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 93 A.3d 760, 767 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2014))).
65 Chalk v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 560 F.3d 1087, 1093–94 (9th Cir. 2009).
66 Id. at 1094. Some states, such as Oregon, require only a showing of substantive unconscionability,
see id., whereas others, such as California, judge unconscionability on a sliding scale, Armendariz v.
Found. Health Psychcare Servs., Inc., 6 P.3d 669, 690 (Cal. 2000) (noting that “[e]ssentially a sliding
scale is invoked which disregards” the degree of procedural unconscionability “in proportion to the
greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves” (quoting 15 WILLISTON ON
CONTRACTS § 1763A (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1972))). While a minority of states, including
Washington and Kansas, require a showing of either procedural or substantive unconscionability, many
others, including Pennsylvania, Florida, Georgia, South Carolina, and Wisconsin, require showings of
both. See Romero v. Allstate Ins. Co., 158 F. Supp. 3d 369, 380 (E.D. Pa. 2016); Gainesville Health Care
Ctr., Inc. v. Weston, 857 So. 2d 278, 284 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003); Wis. Auto Title Loans, Inc. v. Jones,
714 N.W.2d 155, 165 (Wis. 2006); York v. Dodgeland of Columbia, Inc., 749 S.E.2d 139, 148 (S.C. Ct.
App. 2013); Mullis v. Speight Seed Farms, Inc., 505 S.E.2d 818, 820 (Ga. App. 1998); Adams v. John
Deere Co., 774 P.2d 355, 357 (Kan. App. 1989); McKee v. AT&T Corp., 191 P.3d 845, 857 (Wash.
2008).
67 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
68 See id. at 336.
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were each charged $30.22 in sales tax.69 When AT&T moved to compel
arbitration in response to their putative class action,70 the Concepcions cited
the California unconscionability doctrine as a ground that “exist[s] at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract.”71 In other words, the
Concepcions claimed that their contract’s arbitration provision should be
exempted from the FAA’s enforcement because of the statute’s savings
clause.72 They argued that the class arbitration waiver was unlawfully
exculpatory and unfairly favored AT&T, making the arbitration provision
the kind that ought not stand.73
In a five–four majority, Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the Court
and citing the same broad federal policy favoring arbitration as in Keating,74
held that the FAA’s savings clause did not permit defenses that either only
apply to arbitration or “derive their meaning from the fact that an agreement
to arbitrate is at issue” to invalidate an arbitration provision.75 Justice Scalia
asserted that the “overarching purpose” of the FAA, as evidenced by its text,
“is to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to their
terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings.”76 He added that to require
the availability of class-wide arbitration would be to interfere with the
“fundamental attributes of arbitration,” thus creating “a scheme inconsistent
with the FAA.”77 Put another way, Justice Scalia’s opinion hinged on the idea
that finding a class arbitration waiver within an arbitration provision
unconscionable would run counter to the very essence of arbitration and
would therefore undermine the purpose of the statute. In his concurrence,
Justice Clarence Thomas argued that the text of the savings clause in § 2 of
the FAA suggests that the savings clause encompasses only a subset of
defenses—specifically, defenses related to the formation of the contract.78
Thus, according to Justice Thomas, claiming that a class arbitration waiver
is substantively—as opposed to procedurally—unconscionable cannot act as
grounds for exception from the statute’s coverage because substantive
unconscionability speaks to the nature of the contract terms themselves, not
the manner in which the agreement was made.79
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
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See id. at 337.
Id.
Id. at 341 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 2).
See id. at 339–40.
See id. at 337–38.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10 (1984).
Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339.
Id. at 344.
Id.
Id. at 354–55 (Thomas, J., concurring).
See id. at 355. For further discussion of the issues with this logic, see infra Part III.
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The impact of the Concepcion decision was profound. It paved the way
for the Court to continue transforming the FAA’s scope and, in particular,
essentially rendered class arbitration waivers impervious to the kinds of
challenges that would permit a court to invalidate them, such as an
unconscionability claim. This impact is evidenced by case law that followed
closely in Concepcion’s wake.80 Shortly after Concepcion, the Court—in
light of both its now highly deferential and resolute positions on class
arbitration waivers and its creation of the effective vindication doctrine in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.81—decided
American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.82 When the plaintiffmerchants in American Express brought a class action suit alleging that their
agreements with American Express violated the Sherman Act,83 American
Express moved to compel individual arbitration pursuant to the arbitration
provision therein.84 Arguing under Mitsubishi’s effective vindication
doctrine, the plaintiffs demonstrated that it would cost an exorbitant
amount—one far greater than any potential recovery amount—for any one
of them to pursue the arbitration individually, thus preventing them from
“effectively vindicating their rights under the Sherman Act.”85 Knocking
most, if not all, of the teeth out of the effective vindication doctrine, the Court
held, for purposes of honoring precedent and the FAA, that effective
vindication was only dicta in Mitsubishi and that as long as the plaintiff could
effectively vindicate its statutory cause of action in the forum of arbitration,
the economic feasibility of doing so did not matter.86 In other words, the
Court read the language of Mitsubishi so literally as to mean that if any
plaintiff could bring its statutory claim in arbitration, the doctrine was
80 See, e.g., Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1160 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that “invalidating
arbitration agreements for lacking class-action provisions” would run directly counter to the FAA and
Concepcion); Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding that arbitration
agreements containing class waivers are enforceable absent a “contrary congressional command” that the
right to aggregate overrides the FAA’s mandate in favor of arbitration).
81 473 U.S. 614 (1985). The Court established the so-called “effective vindication doctrine” in
holding that the presumption in favor of arbitration extends to circumstances “where a party bound by an
arbitration agreement raises claims founded on statutory rights,” “so long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum.” Thomas J. Lilly Jr., The Use
of Arbitration Agreements to Defeat Federal Statutory Rights: What Remains of the Effective Vindication
Doctrine After American Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant?, 61 WAYNE L. REV. 301, 310–11 (2016)
(quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626, 637). In other words, provided the plaintiff could effectively, not
just technically, vindicate her statutory rights through arbitration, courts would defer to arbitration.
82 570 U.S. 228 (2013).
83 The Sherman Act is a core federal antitrust law that outlaws “[e]very contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade,” as well as any monopolization or effort to do so. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–2.
84 Am. Express, 570 U.S. at 231.
85 Lilly, supra note 81, at 315.
86 Am. Express, 570 U.S. at 235–36.
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satisfied even though the costs of arbitration would ensure their rights would
not be effectively vindicated. Thus, the Court did away with yet another
potential obstacle to the enforcement of class arbitration waivers within
arbitration agreements.
Finally, two cases—Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis87 and Lamps Plus, Inc.
v. Varela88—are the most recent examples of the Supreme Court’s
application of the FAA. In Lewis, the Court considered whether employment
agreements could mandate individual arbitration and prohibit class action
lawsuits and then interpreted the FAA to answer in the affirmative.89
Employees involved in the case had signed employment contracts that
contained provisions mandating the resolution of disputes via bilateral
arbitration.90 The employees raised the defense that the National Labor
Relations Act’s protection of employees’ right to “concerted activities”
included protection of the ability to form a plaintiff class.91 The Court relied
on Concepcion to conclude that the alleged defense could not stand because
it “impermissibly disfavor[ed] arbitration.”92
Shortly thereafter, the Court decided Varela, answering the question of
“whether the FAA . . . bars an order requiring class arbitration when an
agreement is not silent, but rather ‘ambiguous’ about the availability of such
arbitration.”93 In that case, Varela’s personal tax information was stolen as a
result of a corporate data breach at his place of employment.94 When a false
tax return was filed in his name, he brought a putative class action in a
California federal district court against his employer, Lamps Plus, which
subsequently moved to compel individual arbitration pursuant to the
employment agreement.95 The Ninth Circuit decided in Varela’s favor
because the agreement was ambiguous as to whether the parties had agreed
to allow for class arbitration.96 In ruling for Varela, the circuit court
implemented California’s contract doctrine of construing any ambiguities
against the drafter—in this case, Lamps Plus.97 The Supreme Court, however,
reversed the Ninth Circuit, reiterating that regardless of any ambiguity, classwide arbitration diverged prominently from “traditional individual
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
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138 S. Ct. 1612 (2018).
139 S. Ct. 1407 (2019).
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139 S. Ct. at 1412.
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Id.
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arbitration,”98 and it held that “arbitration is strictly a matter of consent.”99
Further, because the state’s doctrine would “thwart[] implementation of the
purposes and objectives of the FAA, it [was] preempted.”100
Considering this series of decisions that the Court has handed down on
the scope of the FAA, one could argue that there is little room for any doubt
or change—and indeed some commentators have. For example, Rachel
Schiff, in her student note, explores the possibility of solving the problem
that the Court’s application of the FAA created with respect to employees
who are bound to individual arbitration and wish to bring sexual harassment
claims.101 She concludes that Concepcion and its progeny have “foreclosed”
unconscionability as an avenue for invalidating class arbitration waivers.102
Similarly, in another student note, Jonathon Serafini even advocates for
using the unconscionability doctrine to render arbitration agreements
unenforceable, but he acquiesces to the doctrine’s precedential mootness as
applied to class action waivers.103 Commentators seem to agree that the Court
has made its position clear: Congress, in passing the FAA, enacted a national
policy favoring arbitration, and virtually no challenge—be it state, statutory,
or equitable—will supersede the Act. However, the Court’s stance results
from a decades-in-the-making distortion of the FAA that cannot be left alone
without doing an immense disservice to the Sixty-Eighth Congress’s
legislative intent and to those who bear the burden of this distortion the most.
III. CORRECTING THE “MIS-CONCEPCION”
Since Concepcion, the Court has been fairly consistent regarding the
status of class arbitration waivers’ vulnerability—or lack thereof—under the
FAA. However, the Court’s opinions, particularly those beginning with and
following Concepcion, were born out of an intensely flawed understanding
of the FAA’s intent and scope. Exploring the points of divergence between
the Court’s opinions and the FAA’s legislative history and text reveals that
98

Id. at 1415.
Id. at 1418 (quoting Stolt-Nielsen SA v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 684 (2010)).
100 Colleen M. Baker & Daniel T. Ostas, Ethics of Legal Astuteness: Barring Class Actions Through
Arbitration Clauses, 29 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 399, 413 (2020); see also Varela, 139 S. Ct. at 1418
(noting that a generally applicable rule cannot save an arbitration provision from FAA preemption if it
“interferes with fundamental attributes of arbitration and thus creates a scheme inconsistent with the
FAA” (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011))).
101 See Schiff, supra note 27, at 2727.
102 Id. at 2722.
103 See Jonathon L. Serafini, The Deception of Concepcion: Saving Unconscionability After AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 48 GONZ. L. REV. 187, 212–13 (2013); see also Sam Cleveland, Note, A
Blueprint for States to Solve the Mandatory Arbitration Problem While Avoiding FAA Preemption,
104 MINN. L. REV. 2515, 2539 (stating that “for various reasons [doctrines such as unconscionability]
have become inapplicable to arbitration provisions”).
99
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the repercussions of this misunderstanding and the realities of arbitration
today are disparately harsh and too severe to leave unaddressed. This
exploration of the statute reframes precedent and proposes a solution through
the doctrine of unconscionability.
A. The Court’s Strained Textualism in Concepcion
The Court’s strained textualism in Concepcion and its progeny is
fundamentally at odds with the FAA’s intent. Recall the discussion in Part I
about the enactment of the FAA. Many commentators have written about the
FAA’s history and the congressional intent behind it, and most have
concluded, as does this Note, that the enacting Congress passed the FAA to
institute a mechanism for enforcing the terms of arbitration agreements that
are mutually consented to in commercial, arm’s-length transactions between
two merchants of relatively equal bargaining power.104 In Professor Imre
Szalai’s detailed exploration of the FAA’s history, he discovered that the
“Supreme Court ha[d] grossly erred in interpreting the statute,” for the FAA
was “intended to provide a framework for federal courts to support a limited,
modest system of private dispute resolution for commercial disputes,” not
the Court-created system “involving both state and federal courts and
covering virtually all types of non-criminal disputes.”105 In other words, the
outcome that the FAA would come to supersede preexisting state contract
law was not the enacting Congress’s plan. Nor was, according to Professor
Margaret L. Moses, enforcing arbitration provisions between merchants and
consumers. Professor Moses contends that the “central concept behind the
Act” was to provide for the enforceability of merchant-to-merchant
arbitration agreements, which bind parties of approximately equal
bargaining strength in need of an efficient and inexpensive means for
resolving disputes.106
There are other scholars who argue against this reading of the legislative
history, such as Professor Christopher R. Drahozal. Following the Court’s
Southland Corp. v. Keating decision, which established the FAA’s ability to
104 See, e.g., Schiff, supra note 27, at 2723 (“Most commentators conclude that the FAA was
envisioned as applying to consensual transactions between two merchants of roughly equal bargaining
power.”); Imre Stephen Szalai, Exploring the Federal Arbitration Act Through the Lens of History,
2016 J. DISP. RESOL. 115, 135 (2016) (noting that the FAA’s drafters not only “had a genuine, sincere,
good faith belief” that arbitration provided a streamlined and efficient method to resolve commercial
disputes in a “non-acrimonious setting,” but also sought to create “a system where commercial parties,
with meaningful consent,” would arbitrate their contractual disputes without “caus[ing] harm [to] or
disadvantag[ing] a weaker party” (emphasis added)).
105 Szalai, supra note 104, at 117.
106 Moses, supra note 30, at 106; see also id. at 107 (noting that the enacting legislators indicated
that the FAA would not apply in adhesion contracts and that instead their intent behind the FAA was
voluntary resolution of disputes between merchants).
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preempt state law,107 Professor Drahozal critiqued the Court’s reasoning but
ultimately found that the text of the Act, as well as its history, confirmed that
the statute permitted preemption.108 For example, Professor Drahozal pointed
to § 2, the operative section of the statute, and noted that its mention of
maritime transactions and transactions in interstate commerce demonstrated
an intended scope that covered proceedings in both state and federal court.109
The language of § 2 thus undermined arguments that the FAA was never
intended to apply in state court, according to Professor Drahozal.110
Of course, discussions of legislative history will nearly always lend
themselves to cherry-picking, whereby a given speaker can choose pieces of
the record to support his or her argument. This Note does not purport to
suggest that a complete understanding of a statute can ever entirely rest on
legislative history. Still, taking into consideration the statute’s plain language
alongside much of its history,111 this Note aligns with the work of Professors
Szalai and Moses. After all, “grounds as exist at law . . . for the revocation
of any contract”112 would likely originate from state common law,113
indicating that the Act explicitly provided a means of state contract law
superseding the FAA—the opposite of the result the Supreme Court has
created.
When the Senate Committee considered to which transactions the FAA
ought to apply, some members expressed concerns that arbitration
agreements offered on take-it-or-leave-it bases to “captive” customers are
not really voluntary because customers have no choice but to sign.114 These
members were met with reassurance from the FAA’s supporters that the Act
was not meant to cover “such unequal situations.”115 Further, Julius Cohen,
the principal drafting ABA member, wrote after the FAA’s passage that the
statute was meant to provide a method of dispute resolution “peculiarly
suited to the disposition of the ordinary disputes between merchants as to

107

See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
See Christopher R. Drahozal, In Defense of Southland: Reexamining the Legislative History of
the Federal Arbitration Act, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 124 (2002).
109 See id.
110 See id.
111 See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
112 9 U.S.C. § 2.
113 Mikio Yamaguchi, The Problem of Delay in the Contract Formation Process: A Comparative
Study of Contract Law, 37 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 357, 361–62 (2004) (“In the American legal system,
contract law is primarily common law, consisting of court decisions, which differ from state to state.”).
114 See Schiff, supra note 27, at 2723–24 (citing Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co.,
388 U.S. 395, 414 (1967)).
115 Schiff, supra note 27, at 2724; see Sales and Contracts, supra note 41, at 10.
108
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questions of fact—quantity, quality, time of delivery . . . and the like.”116
While a consumer–merchant transaction may involve similar questions, the
consumer does not possess, as the merchant does, the expertise and regular
susceptibility to frequent, reoccurring issues that call for a flexible, less
formal option for resolution like arbitration. Simply put, the legislative
history of the FAA indicates that it was enacted with the limited purpose of
overcoming the “judicial hostility” to arbitration over contract disputes
between businesses.117
Trying to reconcile these findings with the holdings of the Supreme
Court is a difficult, if not Herculean, task. In the words of Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, “[T]he Court has abandoned all pretense of ascertaining
congressional intent with respect to the [FAA], building instead, case by
case, an edifice of its own creation.”118 Rather than endeavor to administer
the FAA to its intended subjects—commercial actors—the Court’s judgemade policy of favoring arbitration has extended to all corners of the realm
of consumer and employment contracts.119
Under the pretense of abiding by the statute’s intent through textualist
interpretation, Justice Scalia misconstrued its text and purpose. The Court’s
decision in Concepcion instilled in large corporations the audacity to institute
class arbitration waivers on an involuntary basis, taking their liability to
customers off the table.120 At the core of Justice Scalia’s holding is his
insistence that the primary purpose of the FAA, “evident in the text of §§ 2,
3, and 4,” is to ensure that arbitration agreements are enforced “so as to
facilitate streamlined proceedings.”121 Nowhere in the text of the statute,
however, is efficiency or streamlining of procedure mentioned. The text of
§ 2, for instance, simply states that a provision in any interstate commerce
transaction “to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of

116

Julius Henry Cohen & Kenneth Dayton, The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L. REV. 265,
281 (1926).
117 Miller, supra note 31, at 323; see also Joint Hearings at 16 (“What does this bill do? It destroys
the anachronism in the law.”).
118 Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 283 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
119 See Miller supra note 31, at 324 (“Concepcion strikingly exemplifies the extraordinary judicial
extension of the Act’s application to a vast array of consumer contracts that are characterized by their
adhesive nature and by the individual’s complete lack of bargaining power (as well as a probable lack of
understanding of the arbitration clause’s significance).”).
120 See Christopher Boran, Kenneth Kliebard, Steven Reed, Sam Shaulson, James Looby, Michael
Cumming & Heather Nelson, The Use and Enforceability of Class Action Waivers in Arbitration
Agreements in the United States, MORGAN LEWIS (2020), https://www.morganlewis.com/-/media/files/
publication/outside-publication/article/2020/theuseandenforceabilityofclassactionwaiversinarbitration
agreementsintheunitedstates.pdf [https://perma.cc/7WA4-Q8MD] (explaining that courts’ initial hostility
towards class arbitration waivers vanished in the wake of Concepcion).
121 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011).

892

116:875 (2021)

A Pervasive and Common “Mis-Concepcion”

such contract or transaction . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable.”122 Much of the legislative history certainly does make mention
of the desire to allow businesses or merchants to resolve their disputes in a
quicker and less costly fashion than in traditional litigation.123 However, for
the Court to have gathered as much, it would have needed to consult the
legislative record—and in doing so, the Court would have discovered a great
deal of discussion crystallizing the idea that the FAA was intended to apply
to and impact commercial parties of equivalent knowledge and bargaining
power.124 Picking and choosing the pieces of legislative history that support
a manufactured, desired interpretation is a deeply troubling means for
determining the scope of a federal statute like the FAA.125 The Court’s
repeated substitution of its own preferences for those of the legislature
“constitutes a bald-faced usurpation of the legislature’s rightful
policymaking function.”126
The Concepcion majority also relied on the premise that the FAA places
contracts with arbitration clauses on “equal footing with all other contracts,”
and may not be disfavored under any circumstances.127 The majority
contended that to apply the Discover Bank v. Superior Court rule that
allowed for finding class arbitration waivers unconscionable would be to
subvert equality between arbitration and other kinds of agreements.128 On the
contrary, the rule did not invalidate all class arbitration waivers as per se
unconscionable. Instead, the rule applied equally to class arbitration waivers
in arbitration agreements as it did to class action waivers in contracts without

122

9 U.S.C. § 2.
See Moses, supra note 30, at 103; see also Joint Hearings, supra note 33, at 16 (explaining that
businesses favored the FAA “because when business men know that they do not have to get a lawyer in
California to enforce a case that does not involve more than four or five hundred dollars they will do more
business”).
124 See supra notes 36–44 and accompanying text.
125 See Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 25 (2006) (noting
that a common complaint of textualists regarding purposivism, ironically, was that when courts “purport
to find . . . a true underlying purpose,” they are prioritizing their policies over those of Congress).
126 Martin H. Redish & Theodore T. Chung, Democratic Theory and the Legislative Process:
Mourning the Death of Originalism in Statutory Interpretation, 68 TUL. L. REV. 803, 863–64 (1994) (“A
judge who methodically and selectively searches for an ambiguous clause or phrase, or who simply
ignores clear language outright, has engaged in nothing more than disingenuous, result-oriented
lawmaking disguised as interpretation.”).
127 Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008) (quoting Buckeye Check Cashing,
Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006)).
128 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339–343 (2011) (contending that rules
such as the Discover Bank rule “would have a disproportionate impact on arbitration agreements” and
noting that “California’s courts have been more likely to hold contracts to arbitrate unconscionable than
other contracts”).
123
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arbitration provisions.129 Establishing the impossibility of finding such
provisions unconscionable in fact elevates them above other contracts.130
Further, Justice Scalia, a steadfast textualist, seemed to entirely disregard the
text of the savings clause of § 2, which provides that arbitration agreements
will presumably be enforced under the FAA, “save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”131 The Court
admitted that its own precedent had frequently established that the clause
allowed arbitration agreements to be invalidated by “generally applicable
contract defenses, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability.”132 Yet, Justice
Scalia refused to apply the savings clause as written,133 essentially writing a
portion of the FAA’s text out of the statute for the purposes of his preemption
analysis.134 In doing so, Justice Scalia greatly diminished his own credibility
as a textualist, for while he staked his approach to statutory construction in
“the principle of faithful agency—the idea that interpretation ought to effect
the will of Congress”135—he abandoned Congress’s text and achieved a result
contrary to Congress’s intent, trapping consumers in individual arbitration
against corporate actors.
Perhaps the most egregious misconception Justice Scalia put forth was
his statement that class arbitration waivers may not be found unconscionable
under the savings clause of § 2 of the FAA because doing so would allow
plaintiffs to assert a defense targeted at “fundamental attributes” of
arbitration itself.136 The Court claimed that the bilateral—or singular party
versus singular party—nature of individual arbitration is a cornerstone of the
general institution.137 Though the Court pointed to reasons why class
129 Id. at 358–60 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Jodi Wilson, How the Supreme Court Thwarted
the Purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, 63 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 91, 137 (2012) (“The Discover
Bank Rule is a generally applicable state law. It does not target arbitration. Its impact is not limited to
arbitration agreements.”).
130 See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 404 n.12 (1967) (noting that
protecting an arbitration agreement from challenges applicable to all other contracts would actually
“elevate it” over other contracts).
131 9 U.S.C. § 2 (emphasis added).
132 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339 (quoting Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996)).
133 See id.
134 See Wilson, supra note 129, at 125 (“[T]he Court refused to apply the savings clause because
doing so would conflict with that statutory purpose. In effect, the Court wrote the savings clause out of
the FAA for purposes of its preemption analysis.”).
135 Michael Francus, Digital Realty, Legislative History, and Textualism After Scalia, 46 PEPP. L.
REV. 511, 514 (2019) (footnote omitted) (citing William N. Eskridge Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA
L. REV. 621, 650 (1990)).
136 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 343–44 (holding that the savings clause does not permit invalidation of
an arbitration agreement by a defense that derives its meaning from the fact that arbitration itself is at
issue).
137 Id. at 347–48.
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arbitration is less efficient and more procedurally complex,138 in no portion
of the FAA did Congress classify arbitration as a bilateral activity.139
“Arbitration” is defined in the legal context as a “dispute-resolution process
in which the disputing parties choose one or more neutral third parties to
make a final and binding decision resolving the dispute.”140 Thus, the
dictionary definition does not classify arbitration as a bilateral activity either.
It is therefore doubtful that Justice Scalia drew this conclusion from any kind
of legislative or textual support. He attempted to shore up his statement with
an analogy: if the plaintiff claimed that an arbitration agreement was
unconscionable because it did not allow for judicially monitored discovery
or jural intervention, the allegation would clearly be impermissible under the
FAA.141 This is because judicially monitored discovery and jural intervention
are just the type of lengthy proceedings that arbitration is intended to avoid;
their absence from arbitration proceedings is a fundamental attribute of
arbitration. Similar reasoning would befall an unconscionability defense as
it pertains to class arbitration waivers, according to Justice Scalia.142 In other
words, permitting an unconscionability defense to invalidate class arbitration
waivers—provisions that protect the “fundamental” bilateral aspect of
arbitration—would amount to voiding arbitration agreements based on a core
element of arbitration, thus failing to put arbitration agreements on equal
footing with other contracts.143 However, as discussed previously, an
aggregated arbitration does not defy the nature of arbitration itself.
Unfortunately, this misconception has carried through to recent holdings and
substantively impacts plaintiffs’ outcomes today.144
The Court’s flawed reasoning in Concepcion gave it license to continue
the pattern of broadening the FAA’s reach in Varela. The majority recites an
old mantra that “[c]onsent is essential” when it comes to arbitration,145
subconsciously acknowledging that arbitration is meant to apply to
voluntary, commercial contracting partners. It rings hollow to feign that
consent between the parties is at the forefront of the Court’s mind when
138

See id. at 348 (“Classwide arbitration includes absent parties, necessitating additional and
different procedures and involving higher states. Confidentiality becomes more difficult. . . . [A]rbitrators
are not generally knowledgeable in the often-dominant procedural aspects of certification, such as the
protection of absent parties.”).
139 See 9 U.S.C. §§ 2–4.
140 Arbitration, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
141 Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 342.
142 See id. at 344.
143 See id.
144 See Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 138 S. Ct. 1612, 1623 (2018) (“But Concepcion’s essential insight
remains: courts may not allow a contract defense to reshape traditional individualized arbitration by
mandating classwide arbitration procedures without the parties’ consent.”).
145 Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019).
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administering the statute in consumer–corporation agreements that waive the
right to class arbitration. Instead, the Court snubs entirely the intent of the
FAA’s drafters. In consumer–corporation agreements, the party with weaker
bargaining power—the consumer—has no meaningful choice in the matter
because she does not cocreate the arbitration provision; the vendor or
corporation alone lays out the terms. In addition, Justice Sonia Sotomayor
highlights an important point in her dissent in Varela: when an agreement is
ambiguous as to whether or not class arbitration is disallowed, a plaintiff
who signs such an agreement “should not be expected to realize that she is
giving up access” to class arbitration.146 Once again, the Court’s proarbitration policy, inordinately expanded as a result of its Concepcion
opinion, tipped the ambiguity determination against justice.
In the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, the Court has,
over the past decade in particular, interpreted the FAA to apply to a wide
variety of contracts and to preserve class arbitration waivers at virtually all
costs. The practical costs of this framework are extensive. This Note aims to
demonstrate that the modern-day application of the FAA delivers a
disparately harsh impact on socioeconomically deprived and marginalized
consumers and, therefore, must be abolished.
B. The Repercussions of the Court’s Expansion of the FAA
The Court’s framing of the FAA with respect to class arbitration
waivers has generated stark results outside the courthouse. In recent years, it
has become increasingly difficult to “apply for a credit card, use a cellphone,
get cable or Internet service, or shop online without agreeing to private
arbitration.”147 Couple that with the fact that “[t]ens of millions of
consumers” engage in contracts with predispute arbitration clauses and it
starts to become clear how vast of an impact the current FAA interpretation
has had.148 In addition, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB)
found 85% to 100% of arbitration agreements studied across markets
contained class arbitration waivers.149 When questioned, corporations have
been quick to respond that class actions are rendered unnecessary because
arbitration enables individuals, not just businesses, to “resolve their

146

Id. at 1427 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
The same can be said for renting a car or putting a relative in a nursing home. Silver-Greenberg
& Gebeloff, supra note 4.
148 CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY 9 (2015) [hereinafter CFPB ARBITRATION
STUDY], https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.
pdf [https://perma.cc/WG42-LXXV].
149 Id. at 10.
147
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grievances easily.”150 But court records indicate that in reality, most wouldbe claimants drop their search for redress once blocked from aggregating as
a class.151 By contrast, corporations stand to reap tremendous financial
reward by slipping relatively minor fees or charges into large quantities of
customer agreements and removing those customers’ ability to band together
to voice their claims.152
Additionally, businesses have a “built-in adjudicatory and tactical
advantage in arbitration” because they have far more extensive resources and
experience than their consumer opponents do.153 That advantage is even
bigger for businesses who are repeat players in the arbitral arena, as
arbitrators may feel pressured to rule in favor of the company in order to be
employed for future matters.154 Even if arbitrators do not rule for the
companies, companies still may come to garner an understanding of how
various arbitrators operate, which provides them with a strategic advantage
in future proceedings.155 In addition, because parties to an agreement
theoretically write into the arbitration clause whatever rules they prefer,
when the arbitration provision is involuntary or mandatory—as it so often is
in consumer cases—the corporation controls the rules of the procedure and
the consumer has virtually no choice in the matter.156 Studies show that a
majority of full- or part-time arbitrators in employment arbitrations—who
are, incidentally, usually chosen by corporations—have previously worked
as legal counsel for employers.157 As a result, plaintiff-employees are left
facing “neutral” third parties who have experience advocating for the
opposing side.158 Because corporations also set the rules of the arbitration
proceeding, there is little opportunity to curb any biases these former-lawyer
150

Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 4.
Id.
152 Id.
153 Miller, supra note 31, at 329.
154 STONE & COLVIN, supra note 6, at 23.
155 See id.
156 Id. at 17; see also Baker & Ostas, supra note 100, at 401 (“Recent judicial trends, however,
unambiguously enhance corporate prerogatives, tilting economic power to the lawyers who draft—and
to the executives who approve—arbitration clauses that bar class actions.”).
157 See STONE & COLVIN, supra note 6, at 18.
158 See Jeremy McManus, Note, A Motion to Compel Changes to Federal Arbitration Law: How to
Remedy the Abuses Consumers Face When Arbitrating Disputes, 37 B.C. J. L. & SOC. JUST. 177, 197–98
(2017) (“Average consumers do not frequently arbitrate, and are therefore less knowledgeable about
arbitration and are not similarly able to offer repeat business to potential arbitrators.”); Jessica SilverGreenberg & Michael Corkery, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System,’ N.Y. TIMES (Nov.
1, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-thejustice-system.html [https://perma.cc/3UDL-BCTW] (“Private judging is an oxymoron . . . . This is a
business and arbitrators have an economic reason to decide in favor of the repeat players.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
151
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arbitrators may have in favor of the employer. There is little reason to think
the same would not be true with regard to corporation–consumer disputes.
Research also indicates that consumers face a steep uphill climb if they hope
to secure any kind of remedy through individual arbitration.159
Corporations and courts operate under the presumption that arbitration
will always be more cost-effective, simpler, and quicker than traditional
litigation, and they use this notion to further bolster the rationale behind
upholding class action waivers. In doing so, corporations and courts ignore
the inherent inconsistency with this argument: if arbitration genuinely aided
consumers in seeking redress individually, thousands of separate
proceedings for similar, if not identical, claims would plainly be far less
efficient and more burdensome for the corporation than would be a single
class proceeding for the same matter.160 Additionally, while it is often true
that arbitration will span a shorter period than litigation will, the difference
is not vast.161 Some even argue that whether litigation or arbitration is a better
fit for a given dispute is a case-by-case inquiry, and that neither choice is
inherently better or worse because delays and costs are concerns in either
setting.162 Moreover, arbitration can, at times, exceed litigation’s burdens
with substantial filing and administrative fees163 and a longer duration, as
159 See CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 148, at 12 (showing that 32 out of 341 cases where
outcome could be ascertained and that were resolved via arbitration in 2010–2011 resulted in the
consumer receiving relief, and of the 19 consumer affirmative claims for less than $1000 resolved via
arbitration in the same period, 4 resulted in consumer relief); see also STONE & COLVIN, supra note 6, at
19 (noting that employees win in arbitration “about a fifth of the time (21.4 percent), which is 59 percent
as often as in the federal courts and only 38 percent as often as in state courts”).
160 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 362 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Recently, DoorDash, a widely used food-delivery company, learned this uncomfortable truth the hard
way—when three thousand employees brought individual arbitrations under the umbrella of a law firm
willing to represent them, the court denied DoorDash the option to insist upon a class action suit, as
DoorDash, too, was bound by the individual arbitration clause. Michael Hiltzik, DoorDash Thought It
Was Smart to Force Workers to Arbitrate but Now Faces Millions in Fees, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2020,
2:48 P.M.), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-02-11/doordash-arbitration-blunder [https://
perma.cc/KJ5J-S364].
161 See CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 148, at 13–14 (comparing the average seven-month
span of a class action suit to the potential five-month span of an arbitration). But the American Arbitration
Association clocks the average arbitration proceeding at seven months—the same length as the CFPB’s
finding for a class action. See Consumer Arbitration Fact Sheet, supra note 16.
162 E. Norman Veasey, The Conundrum of the Arbitration vs. Litigation Decision, AM. BAR ASS’N
(Dec. 15, 2015), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2015/12/07_veasey/
[https://perma.cc/7FG8-EPNJ].
163
See CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 148, at 13; see also Arbitration vs. Litigation: The
Choice Matters, WARNER NORCROSS & JUDD (Feb. 8, 2018) [hereinafter Arbitration vs. Litigation],
https://wnj.com/Publications/Arbitration-vs-Litigation-The-Choice-Matters
[https://perma.cc/9E3M4RZL] (“And while there are potential cost savings with respect to discovery [in arbitration], it is
important to remember that, unlike litigation, arbitration often requires substantial filing and advanced
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arbitrators will generally allow parties to change their claims and arguments
more often.164
A pro-corporation commentator might claim that consumers benefit
from mandatory arbitration because corporations potentially price their
implicated products and services lower, knowing that they will not have to
face the financial burden of litigation in the future. However, a 2015 CFPB
study showed that, in a comparison of credit card companies that maintained
their implementation of arbitration clauses and companies that eliminated
those clauses from their agreements, no statistically significant increase in
prices occurred in the latter group.165 At base, for this pro-corporation
argument to have any strength at all, the reduction in price would need to be
sizable enough to the consumer to justify the possibility that she would have
to take on the fees and travel expenses of individual arbitration. These
expenses can at times be quite substantial, particularly when the consumer is
a low-level employee.166 In other words, if a consumer’s limited options for
redress are to be justified under a reduced cost of doing business, that
reduced cost should at least be commensurate with the consumer’s
sacrifice.167 The likelihood, then, of justifying the choice to institute
mandatory arbitration by offering a product or service at a slightly lower
price is slim, at best.
The Court’s attitude towards, and implementation of, the FAA in the
past decade would suggest that its primary concern lies with avoiding the
burdens litigation places on corporations. But what of the considerable
burdens mandatory arbitration, coupled with class arbitration waivers, places
on consumers? The concerns behind this question reach a fever pitch when
taking into account the disparately harsh impact the FAA’s current
application has on socioeconomically deprived and marginalized consumers.
Socioeconomic status can point to an individual’s “unequal access to
resources, privilege, power, and control in a society.”168 Recent labor
administrative fees—typically in the thousands or tens of thousands—at the outset, as well as significant
daily or hourly fees for the arbitrator’s . . . time.” (emphasis added)).
164 See Arbitration vs. Litigation, supra note 163.
165 See CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 148, at 18.
166 Rice, supra note 43, at 197–98; see also Albert H. Choi & Kathryn Spier, The Economics of Class
Action Waivers, 38 YALE J. ON REGUL. 543, 556 (2021) (noting that “it is well documented that
consumers fail to read the fine print in contracts that they sign,” and that when “consumers’ willingness
to pay for a product is relatively invariant to the inclusion or exclusion of a class action waiver” in the
contract at issue, “firms cannot capture the social benefits of class action litigation and are therefore more
likely to require class action waivers as a cost-saving measure”).
167 This could be mitigated or impacted by the company’s litigation or dispute-resolution history.
168 REGINALD A. NOËL, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., RACE, ECONOMICS, AND SOCIAL STATUS 1
(2018), https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2018/race-economics-and-social-status/pdf/race-economics-andsocial-status.pdf [https://perma.cc/9Q3Z-2JEH].
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statistics show a gulf between the average household pretax income in
America—$70,448—and that of the average Black or African-American
household—$48,871.169 The gulf widens when accounting for gender pay
gaps.170 Further, in 2016, 72% of white families owned their homes, whereas
only 44% of Black families did.171 Because homeownership provides
families a major source of untaxed income, this statistic further signifies the
socioeconomic disparity across groups.172 It stands to reason, then, that
consumers belonging to marginalized groups have a far greater chance of
being harmed financially by the FAA’s refusal to exempt class arbitration
waivers from their agreements, as these consumers will face the tallest
financial obstacles should they attempt to seek relief on their own. In
addition to the economic concerns, household occupations influence
household social networks. For instance, a recent study found that 23% of
Hispanic or Latinx households were supported by a member who worked in
childcare, food preparation or service, janitorial service, or maid service,173
and that 11.6% of Black households were supported by a single female
parent.174 Consumers from Black or Latinx households may face greater
difficulty in having to miss work to attend their arbitration hearings, which
can go on for months,175 than someone whose occupation is more flexible or
who has a social network that may encompass a lawyer who could advocate
on her behalf—maybe even free of charge.

169 Id. (discussing data from the 2014–2016 period); see also Racial Economic Inequality,
INEQUALITY.ORG, https://inequality.org/facts/racial-inequality/ [https://perma.cc/8AYU-B3L4] (stating
that as of the last quarter of 2020, the median white worker’s income surpassed that of the median Black
worker and median Latinx worker by 27% and 36%, respectively).
170 See Median Usual Weekly Earnings of Full-Time Wage and Salary Workers by Selected
Characteristics, Quarterly Averages, Not Seasonally Adjusted, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT. (Apr. 16,
2021), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/wkyeng.t02.htm [https://perma.cc/2492-A54Z] (showing that
in the second quarter of 2021, the median weekly earnings for white women was $921 compared to $1,115
for white men, whereas for Black or African-American women and men the numbers were $746 and
$877, respectively, and for Hispanic or Latinx women and men, $714 and $825, respectively).
171 See Racial Economic Inequality, supra note 169 (noting additionally that while the
homeownership rate among Latinx families increased by nearly 40% between 1983 and 2016, it remains
at 45%, far below the rate for white families); see also NOËL, supra note 168, at 6 (finding that 41% of
Native Hawaiians or Pacific Islanders owned rather than rented their homes in 2014–2016, as compared
to 71% of white households during the same time period).
172 For example, homeowners do not count the rental value of their homes as taxable income, though
it is a return on investment much like stock dividends, and homeowners can exclude (up to a point)
proceeds from the sale of their homes as capital gains. See What Are the Tax Benefits of Homeownership?,
TAX POL’Y CTR. (May 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-tax-benefitshomeownership [https://perma.cc/9QJ6-VKXQ].
173 NOËL, supra note 168, at 7.
174 Id. at 9.
175 See Shierholz, supra note 17.
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That at least some corporations exploit particular consumer groups’
vulnerability is a near certainty. One example is predatory lenders who
charge racial-minority borrowers more for loans and other services than
similarly situated white borrowers, otherwise known as “price
discrimination.”176 Race-based price discrimination spiked prior to the 2008
housing crisis, but existed before then and has since been a widespread
practice.177 The severity of predatory lending practices is further exposed
when lenders are put in a position to be able to foist emergency payday loans
with annual interest rates as high as 700% on already-vulnerable
communities.178
Simply put, given the occurrence of corporate exploitation of certain
consumer groups, the legal system needs to take social realities into account
to temper the rampant appearances of class arbitration waivers.179 Doing so
is not without precedent. For example, in recognition of the discriminatory
impact of predatory lending practices, members of Congress introduced the
Loan Shark Prevention Act in early 2019 to protect consumers “already
burdened with exorbitant credit-card interest rates” from predatory lending
practices.180
Courts often approach contracts cases with a particular mindset—that
contracting parties should be able to look out for their own interests and
protect themselves accordingly, avoiding unfair bargains by simply doing

176 Alexandra Twin, Price Discrimination, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 18, 2021), https://investopedia.com/
terms/p/price_discrimination.asp [https://perma.cc/42S8-FU3Z]. The factor on which a business bases
different pricing schemes need not be race or another protected category. For example, charging different
prices for personal, education, and business licenses of a software program is a form of price
discrimination. Id.
177 Larry Schwartztol, Predatory Lending: Wall Street Profited, Minority Families Paid the Price,
ACLU (Sept. 16, 2011, 4:35 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/racial-justice/race-and-economic-justice/
predatory-lending-wall-street-profited-minority [https://perma.cc/4R7Q-UVPH] (pointing out that Wall
Street and banks also contributed to the problem by encouraging lenders to “maximize volume at all
costs—including by peddling loans with abusive terms and an elevated risk of ending in foreclosure”);
Neil Howe, A Special Price Just for You, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2017, 5:56 PM), https://forbes.com/sites/
neilhowe/2017/11/17/a-special-price-just-for-you/?sh=7705724890b3 (noting that it is only illegal to
practice price discrimination based on race if it causes another company “competitive injury”).
178 Lori Teresa Yearwood, Many Minorities Avoid Seeking Credit Due to Generations of
Discrimination. Why that Keeps Them Back, CNBC (Sept. 1, 2019, 9:30 AM), https://www.cnbc.
com/2019/09/01/many-minorities-avoid-seeking-credit-due-to-decades-of-discrimination.html [https://
perma.cc/F7S8-2QN3].
179 Hila Keren, Law and Economic Exploitation in an Anti-Classification Age, 42 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
313, 345 (2015).
180 This legislation, which is currently in review with House Committee on Financial Services, would
“cap interest rates at 15%, likely benefiting many consumers of color.” Yearwood, supra note 178; Loan
Shark Prevention Act, H.R. 2930, 116th Cong. (2019).
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the requisite information gathering.181 This narrative is only effective,
however, in a world where the parties encounter each other on approximately
equal social and economic footing.182 In the Supreme Court cases previously
discussed, this was not the case.
The Court’s recent opinion in Bostock v. Clayton County is relevant
here. In Bostock, the issue was whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act’s
prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex encompassed
homosexual and transgender individuals.183 The majority applied a textualist
interpretation of the statute to conclude that discrimination against one’s
sexual orientation is inextricably linked to one’s gender.184 Though the
Court’s holding rests on textualism, rejecting the need for other arguments
because the statute’s language was unambiguous, the Court also addressed
purposivist arguments—considering the text in light of the enacting
Congress’s legislative intent—in response to those who would argue that the
1964 Congress would not have intended to protect transgender and
homosexual employees.185 Ultimately, the Court concluded that Congress
intentionally worded the statute broadly, and thus refused to read Title VII
as excluding homosexual and transgender individuals from its protection. If
the Court had chosen instead to “tilt the scales of justice in favor of the strong
or popular and neglect the promise that all persons” are entitled to the same
treatment under the law, the Court would not be carrying out its role
faithfully.186 To read and apply the FAA as the Court has does not provide
everyone equal treatment under the law. Instead, the Court has tipped the
scales of justice in favor of the strong and delivered a disparately harsh punch
to the marginalized.
Bostock is not the only recent Supreme Court statutory interpretation
opinion to discuss, albeit briefly, a statute’s context and purpose. In Bond v.
United States, a chemist discovered that her friend was pregnant by the
chemist’s husband, and in seeking revenge, the chemist spread two
potentially lethal chemicals on her friend’s car door, mailbox, and door
knob.187 She was subsequently prosecuted for and convicted of violating the
Chemical Weapons Convention Implementation Act188 by “possess[ing]” and

181

See Marjorie Florestal, Is a Burrito a Sandwich? Exploring Race, Class, and Culture in Contracts,
14 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1, 45 (2008).
182 See id.
183
140 S. Ct. 1731, 1737 (2020).
184 See id. at 1749.
185 See Bostock, 140 S. Ct. at 1749–50.
186 Id. at 1751–53.
187 572 U.S. 844, 852 (2014).
188 18 U.S.C. § 229(a).
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“us[ing]” a “chemical weapon.”189 The statute defines “chemical weapon” as
“any chemical which through its chemical action on life processes can cause
death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans.”190 Though
both of the substances the chemist used fell under the literal, plain meaning
of the statute, the Supreme Court reversed the conviction,191 in part because
the statute was a “product of years of worldwide study . . . and multinational
negotiation [that] arose in response to war crimes and acts of terrorism.”192
As such, the Court reasoned that it was highly unlikely that the drafters were
concerned about a “common law assault” like this one.193
Similarly, Yates v. United States also involved the prosecution of an
individual under a criminal statute,194 this time the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.195
The defendant had, during a federal investigation, thrown back to sea
undersized fish because catching them violated conservation regulations.196
When the defendant’s actions came to light, the government charged him
with knowingly “destroying, concealing, and covering up undersized fish to
impede a federal investigation.”197 Because the statute prevented tampering
with “any record, document, or tangible object,”198 the question was whether
an undersized fish constituted a “tangible object” under the statute.199 After
conceding that a fish is a tangible object under the ordinary meaning of the
words,200 the Court’s plurality noted that, because the statute’s intent was to
curb “corporate and accounting deception and coverups,” to free the phrase
“tangible object” from its “financial-fraud mooring” would be to
misinterpret the enacting Congress’s words.201
That the plurality then turned its reasoning to semantic, or text-based,
canons of statutory interpretation202 does not negate the role that purposivism
played in the opinion. If anything, these opinions serve to highlight the
Court’s willingness to pair textualism with purposivist elements to reach a
189

Bond, 572 U.S. at 852–53.
18 U.S.C. § 229F(8)(A).
191 Bond, 572 U.S. at 866.
192 Id. at 856.
193 Id.
194 574 U.S. 528, 534 (2015) (plurality opinion).
195 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
196 Yates, 574 U.S. at 533–34 (plurality opinion).
197 Id. at 534.
198 18 U.S.C. § 1519.
199 Yates, 574 U.S. at 532 (plurality opinion).
200 Id. (“A fish is no doubt an object that is tangible; fish can be seen, caught, and handled . . . .”).
201 Id. at 532, 539–40.
202 See, e.g., id. at 544 (noting that in the context of the series of words in which it falls, the phrase
“tangible object” refers “specifically to the subset of tangible objects involving records and documents,
i.e., objects used to record or preserve information”).
190
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more holistically reasoned outcome.203 Thus, future litigants seeking to
dismantle a class arbitration waiver despite the FAA should feel confident in
launching attacks with both textualist and purposivist bases. As previously
discussed, the FAA’s text plainly allows for a finding of unconscionability
in arbitration provisions. Furthermore, should there be any remaining
ambiguity, the statute’s history elucidates that the enacting legislature would
never have intended for the statute to allow corporate predatory tactics to
flourish unchecked.
Given the considerable harms today’s arbitration practices and
application of the FAA have inflicted on consumers, and in particular on the
most socioeconomically deprived and marginalized, some kind of
intervention is past due. One potential avenue for intervention is bringing the
unconscionability doctrine out of retirement in the class arbitration waiver
context.
C. A Legal Realism Case for an Unconscionability Defense
The task ahead involves finding a way to effectively respond to the
enforcement of class arbitration waivers against parties of disparate
bargaining power. Though this question has spurred bountiful scholarly
discussion, most scholars seem to feel limited by the Supreme Court’s
precedents to date. Even those scholars who propose solutions often
summarily state that unconscionability is no longer a possible avenue for
escaping a class arbitration waiver after Concepcion.204
A recent effort that seemed promising but ultimately failed was a rule
the CFPB promulgated in 2017 pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act.205 The rule covered, among other
things, specific consumer financial products and services agreements,
wherein covered providers would be prohibited from including pre-dispute
class arbitration waivers.206 However, in November 2017 President Trump
signed a joint resolution passed by Congress disapproving of the rule.207
203 Redish & Chung, supra note 126, at 815 (defining the goal of purposivism as “giving effect to
the wishes of the enacting legislature” by “identify[ing] the statute’s broader purposes and . . . resolv[ing]
the interpretive question in light of those purposes”).
204 See supra notes 101–103 and accompanying text.
205 12 C.F.R. § 1040 (2017).
206 See Final Rule: Arbitration Agreements, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU (Nov. 22, 2017), https://
www.consumerfinance.gov/rules-policy/final-rules/arbitration-agreements/
[https://perma.cc/8NKEVQ6E].
207 See id.; 82 Fed. Reg. 55,500 (Nov. 22, 2017); see also MAEVE P. CAREY & CHRISTOPHER M.
DAVIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT (CRA): FREQUENTLY ASKED
QUESTIONS 13–14 (2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/misc/R43992.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q4MZ-G2Y2]
(describing the process by which a joint resolution of disapproval passes through Congress under the
Congressional Review Act).

904

116:875 (2021)

A Pervasive and Common “Mis-Concepcion”

Other proposed solutions include recommending true amendments to the
FAA’s text. Jeremy McManus, for example, suggested an amendment that
would include express permissions allowing states to implement their own
contract laws to remove an arbitration agreement from the statute’s
coverage.208 While such a result would likely pave a smoother route to
remediation, there are no indicia of such legislative action on the horizon.
On the other hand, some recent developments have potential for
success. For example, some companies no longer require employees to
arbitrate sexual harassment claims,209 which may suggest a decrease in the
pervasiveness of arbitration (and, by extension, class arbitration waivers).
More importantly in the consumer context, the House of Representatives
passed the Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act (FAIR Act) in September
2019.210 The FAIR Act is specifically meant to prohibit pre-dispute
arbitration agreements containing class arbitration waivers in the consumer,
employment, antitrust, or civil rights dispute contexts.211 The FAIR Act has
been received by the Senate and referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary.212
Despite these discrete, still-pending attempts, there remains a need for
a framework that can stave off at least some of the current exploitation that
corporations inflict on vulnerable consumers. This Note presents a novel
proposal to pursue an unconscionability defense grounded in legal realist
notions—those that look at contemporary policy considerations and shape
doctrine accordingly.213
The contract law doctrine of unconscionability would fit the mold.
Notwithstanding the recent spike in its use, the doctrine dates back to the
seventeenth-century English courts of equity.214 In their earlier days, U.S.
courts of law adopted and implemented England’s equitable doctrines—
including fraud, duress, mistake, and unconscionability—to craft more
complete justice.215 For the most part, however, unconscionability was not
208 See McManus, supra note 158, at 206–08; see also William W. Park, Amending the Federal
Arbitration Act, 13 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 75, 77–78 (2002) (proposing an amendment to specifically
address international arbitration).
209 Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1422 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
210 Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019).
211 See id. at § 2.
212 Id. (referred on Sept. 24, 2019).
213
See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text.
214 See McCullough, infra note 64, at 787–88.
215 Rice, supra note 43, at 159; see also Equity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining
equity as “[t]he recourse to principles of justice to correct or supplement the law as applied to particular
circumstances; specif., the judicial prevention of hardship that would otherwise ensue from the literal
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recognized as a valid contract defense until the widespread adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) in the mid-twentieth century.216
Thereafter, courts applied the doctrine to invalidate many types of provisions
in adhesive contracts and as a tool to protect the poor, in particular, from
abusive agreements.217 Even so, courts applied the doctrine sparsely from the
mid-twentieth century through the 1990s.218 Since the turn of the millennium,
however, unconscionability has increasingly been brought as a defense in
contract disputes, provided that, in most jurisdictions, elements of both
procedural and substantive unconscionability are at play.219
One potential issue that could arise in applying the unconscionability
doctrine to exempt class arbitration waivers from the FAA, however, is the
argument Justice Thomas raised in his concurrence in Concepcion. Recall
that Justice Thomas argued that only defenses that deal strictly with the
making of a contract would fall under the savings clause of § 2.220 But, quite
often,
“procedural
and
substantive
unconscionability
occur
simultaneously”—unfairness begets unfairness—and some judges will
consider the same factors in establishing each strain.221 In other words,
substantive unconscionability is “linked inextricably with the process of
contract formation” because it is at formation that the injured party would
have had to agree to the objectively unreasonable term or terms.222
Some scholars, such as Professor Deborah Zalesne, may also take issue
with the notion of using unconscionability as a defense in circumstances
involving marginalized or socioeconomically deprived consumers. These

interpretation of a legal instrument”). Thus, in aiming to provide relief that is fair and just, courts have
discretion, particularly in the realm of contracts, to grant equitable remedies or accept equitable defenses
to prevent an unfeeling, harsh outcome that might result from following the common law to the letter.
See Kevin C. Kennedy, Equitable Remedies and Principled Discretion: The Michigan Experience, 74 U.
DET. MERCY L. REV. 609, 610 (1997).
216 Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of Unconscionability as the “Law of the Poor,” 102 GEO. L.J.
1383, 1390 (2014); Richard L. Barnes, Rediscovering Subjectivity in Contracts: Adhesion and
Unconscionability, 66 LA. L. REV. 123, 149–50 (2005) (“[Unconscionability’s] acceptance as a
mainstream doctrine, a ready aid in contract limitation, dates back only to its inclusion in the UCC.”); see
also Fleming, supra, at 1403–04 (“Section 2-302 [of the UCC] allowed judges to refuse to enforce
‘unconscionable’ terms in sales contracts. The Code did not define ‘unconscionable.’ Rather, it directed
judges to evaluate the objectionable clause in light of the ‘general commercial background’ and the ‘needs
of the particular trade or case.’”).
217 See McCullough, supra note 64, at 795–96.
218 See id. at 786.
219 See id. at 781–82; see also Rice, supra note 43, at 161–63 (discussing the various approaches to
the procedural/substantive calculus in different jurisdictions).
220 See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 355 (2011) (Thomas, J., concurring);
supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
221 Rice, supra note 43, at 169.
222 Brewer v. Mo. Title Loans, 364 S.W.3d 486, 493 (Mo. 2012).
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scholars claim that “discussions about an individual party’s vulnerability
often promotes raced reasoning in which the reader is encouraged to conflate
social and economic marginalization with incompetence, lack of education,
and an absence of savvy.”223 In other words, Professor Zalesne’s concern
seems to be that raising an unconscionability defense that claims a racial
minority consumer had the wool pulled over his eyes at the formation of the
contract due to, for instance, his substandard education, furthers negative
racial stereotypes. It is true that the elements of procedural unconscionability
are usually satisfied in these cases, wherein the consumer is made to sign a
credit card or phone agreement, for instance, without any opportunity to
negotiate or discuss terms. In addition, more likely than not, consumers do
not possess enough awareness of the repercussions of entering an agreement
with a class arbitration waiver to have given the “consent” that is so
“essential” to arbitration.224 These procedural elements are not necessarily
“raced,” but rather exist for virtually every consumer who enters such a deal.
Further, the application of the unconscionability doctrine that this Note
proposes zeroes in on the substantively unconscionable, or harsh and onesided, nature of class arbitration waivers that is particularly prevalent in
marginalized communities for the reasons pertaining to the United States’
socioeconomic reality described in Section III.B, not because of the
paternalistic undertones Professor Zalesne warns against. With the inclusion
of a class arbitration waiver, the arbitration agreement is inherently onesided and oppressive against a consumer hoping to seek redress. The
substantive unconscionability of class arbitration waivers, in other words, is
uniquely potent when waivers are used to further corporations’ predatory
practices against members of socioeconomically deprived and marginalized
communities. There is, then, strong realist support for the argument that
unconscionability should be used to shield plaintiffs from the FAA when
circumstances insist upon it—not because marginalized plaintiffs are
uniquely ill-equipped to defend themselves, but because jurisprudence in the
United States ought never be permitted to facilitate corporate predation.

223 Deborah Zalesne, Racial Inequality in Contracting: Teaching Race as a Core Value, 3 COLUM.
J. RACE & L. 23, 33–35 (2013) (discussing the issues with Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co.,
350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965), one of the earliest prominent unconscionability cases in U.S. courts).
224 Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 139 S. Ct. 1407, 1416 (2019); see also Stolt-Nielsen SA v.
AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (“Whether enforcing an agreement to arbitrate or
construing an arbitration clause, courts and arbitrators must ‘give effect to the contractual rights and
expectations of the parties.’ In this endeavor, ‘as with any other contract, the parties’ intentions control.’”
(internal citations omitted) (quoting Volt Info Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 479 (1989))); CFPB ARBITRATION STUDY, supra note 148, at 11 (describing how credit
card consumers generally are either unaware of the existence of an arbitration clause in their contracts
and/or are mistaken about their ability to seek redress in class actions in the future).
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Unconscionability would serve as a useful vehicle for combatting class
arbitration waivers on realist grounds because it is one of the broadest
equitable doctrines.225 The framework would apply consistently across
states—despite jurisdictional variances as to what quantum of procedural or
substantive unconscionability is required to assert an effective defense, there
is by and large uniformity in understanding of those elements among the
jurisdictions.226
Furthermore, because many contract disputes today invoke the
unconscionability doctrine, it is not surprising that it has been successfully
asserted in litigation against arbitration provisions—albeit for reasons
unrelated to the ability to aggregate as a class.227 In these cases, courts have
declared arbitration provisions substantively unconscionable for their costprohibitive aspects related to forced venue or forum selection clauses that
placed too great of a travel-related burden on the consumer. Remember
Justice Scalia’s conclusion that, like unconscionability arguments based on
the lack of available discovery or jural intervention, unconscionability
arguments arising from the class arbitration waiver would destroy a
fundamental attribute of the FAA and arbitration itself, and are therefore
impermissible.228 Whereas Justice Scalia drew no meaningful connection
whatsoever between the lack of traditional litigation benefits and the class
arbitration waiver, there are clear points of convergence between an
argument for unconscionability in a class arbitration waiver and an argument
for unconscionability in a forum selection clause. Both clauses can be
considerably costly and burdensome for the consumer on whom such
provisions are forced. Of course, there might be cases in which neither clause
would be burdensome to a particular plaintiff, such as if the potential reward
the plaintiff stands to receive merits an individual case or if the plaintiff lives
in the selected forum. Such plaintiffs would not succeed in bringing this kind
of unconscionability defense, but the possible existence of such plaintiffs
does not diminish the benefit the unconscionability defense would provide
for the vast majority of other consumers.
Finally, perhaps the simplest and strongest rationale for creating an
unconscionability exception to the FAA’s scope when social justice concerns
Keren, supra note 179, at 355 (mentioning that “each of the other three [equitable doctrines] has
a more specific focus (threat for duress, fraud for misrepresentation, and abuse of dependency for undue
influence),” whereas unconscionability belongs to no one particular manifestation).
226 Id. (noting that there is uniformity across jurisdictions in the test on two elements—procedural
and substantive—and the nature of those elements).
227 See Gandee v. LDL Freedom Enters., Inc., 293 P.3d 1197, 1202–03 (Wash. 2013); Magno v. Coll.
Network, Inc., 1 Cal. App. 5th 277, 289 (2016); Newton v. Am. Debt Servs., Inc., 549 F. App’x 692, 694
(9th Cir. 2013).
228 AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343–44 (2011).
225
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insist upon it is that such an exception already exists in the plain language of
the FAA’s operative provision. Section 2 of the Act provides for the
enforcement of arbitration agreements “save upon such grounds as exist at
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”229 The Supreme Court
has already included unconscionability in the class of “generally applicable
contract defenses”230 that fall under the savings clause. It is the job of a given
court, when deciding whether to grant or deny a motion to compel
arbitration, to apply state laws governing contract formation and related
defenses.231 As such, when presented with a contract dispute regarding
whether or not to uphold a class arbitration waiver between a commercial
entity and a consumer, a court should, without great difficulty, be able to
apply an unconscionability analysis to determine whether the term’s
harshness or one-sidedness to the particular consumer is too great to ignore.
Put that way, it seems self-evident that the savings clause of the FAA, or at
least its mention of grounds at equity, was written into the statute for
precisely the circumstances in which social justice concerns are so
significant that they overwhelm any interest in enforcing the class arbitration
waiver.
CONCLUSION
A viable unconscionability defense against class arbitration waivers in
the corporation–consumer context will follow as a natural result if litigants
attack or seek to constrain AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion on textualist,
purposivist, and legal realist grounds. Beginning with a textualist approach
suits the current Supreme Court’s statutory construction practices; it
considers the text of the statute to be “the best evidence of legislative purpose
and the only product of the Constitution’s requirements of bicameralism and
presentment.”232 The text of the FAA’s § 2 savings clause unambiguously
provides for an unconscionability finding and makes no mention of
efficiency or bilaterality. If the Court remains unpersuaded, it may put on its
purposivist hat, turn to the history and purpose of the statute, and find that
the FAA was not intended to act as a vehicle for corporate absolution and
dominance over consumers, but rather to assist commercial contracting
parties in their arm’s-length transactions. This purposivist reading of the
FAA leads inexorably to the realist conclusion that the disproportionately
harmful impact the FAA’s current application has on socioeconomically

229
230
231
232

9 U.S.C. § 2.
Dr.’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687 (1996).
Rice, supra note 43, at 224.
Redish & Chung, supra note 126, at 809.
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deprived and marginalized consumers is exactly what the drafters aimed to
avoid. On these bases, litigants’ path to redress is very much within reach.
With the jurisprudence as it currently stands, the Patricia Rowes of the
world face a lose–lose choice between paying steep, unfair fees, or pursuing
even more costly individual dispute resolution. The vast majority opt for the
former because the latter comes with the additional indeterminate burdens of
financial cost and time investment. Consumers are entitled to have their
claims meaningfully heard. Corporations, in fact, need consumers with
whom to contract in order to survive. For corporations to take hold of
consumers’ finances and exploit their vulnerabilities by ensnaring them in
the inherently losing scenario that is an arbitration agreement with a class
arbitration waiver is, in essence, inequitable. With that in mind, the inequities
of arbitration as it is currently forced upon consumers should “shock the
conscience” of the community,233 thereby opening the door to an
unconscionability defense as permitted by the FAA.

233
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See supra note 64 and accompanying text.

